General Washington Has Done It Again

Despite having trivial experience in commanding large, conventional military forces, Washington's stiff leadership presence and fortitude held the American military together long enough to secure victory at Yorktown and independence for his new nation.

one. Washington was appointed commander of the Continental Ground forces on June 14, 1775

On June 14, 1775, the 2nd Continental Congress, responding to the growing crisis near Boston, directed that one of its ain constituents – George Washington – take command of the newly designated Continental Army. Not only did Washington have the most military feel amongst the Congressional delegates, but as John Adams pointed out there were besides slap-up political advantages in having a someone outside of New England take control of a military force that was congregated around Boston and largely made up of New Englanders.

Arriving presently afterward the determination of the Battle of Bunker Hill, Washington moved swiftly to assume command of the ragtag forces surrounding besieging the British garrison within the city of Boston. What Washington did not realize at the time was that it would be six long years of battle, marching, siege, crises, and winter encampments before Washington had an opportunity to return to his dear Mountain Vernon. In September 1781, as the combined American and French forces made their way down to Yorktown, Virginia, Washington was able to make a brief visit to his home forth the Potomac River. During this visit, Washington and Rochambeau refined their plan for defeating Charles Cornwallis' forces trapped on the York Peninsula.

2. Prior to his appointment as head of the Continental Army, Washington had never allowable a large ground forces in the field

George Washington was simply one of merely a scattering of candidates considered by the Second Continental Congress who possessed whatsoever significant military experience. But past European standards Washington'due south feel in commanding big conventional armies was non-real. Leading up to the French & Indian War, Washington had ably allowable the Virginia Regiment, but this provincial military unit never had more than 2,000 men in its ranks. In 1754 Washington commanded roughly 100 regulars and 300 militia at the sick-fated Boxing of Fort Necessity.

Despite this seeming lack of experience in managing large regular army formations, Washington brought a number of strengths to his new position equally commander of the Continental Army. Washington had learned many important command principles from the British regular officers that he marched with during the French & Indian War and British regular army manuals that he studied. He likewise witnessed, firsthand, how vulnerable British formations could exist in the rough, timbered borderland land that predominated in North America. His verve, impressive physical presence, and command instincts helped to concur together an sick-equipped force that outlasted his more than experienced opponents. And as Benjamin Franklin would famously state, "[a]north American planter, who had never seen Europe, was called by the states to Control our Troops, and continued during the whole War. This human being sent dwelling to you, ane after another, 5 of your best generals, baffled, their Heads bare of Accolade, disgraced even in the Opinion of their Employers."

And so much for conventional experience.

3. Washington and the Continental army narrowly escaped full devastation in the New York campaign of 1776

Dissimilar the successful Siege of Boston, the efforts to defend the metropolis of New York ended in well-nigh disaster for the Continental Army and the cause of independence. In what proved to be the largest battle of the Revolutionary State of war in terms of total combatants, Washington's forces on August 22, 1776, were flanked out of their positions atop the Gowanus Heights (part of today'southward modern Brooklyn) and soundly defeated by William Howe's roughly 20,000 man force on Long Island.

Confronted by a powerful British army to his front end and the E River to his back, Washington rapidly formulated a risky plan to salvage his threatened army atop Brooklyn Heights. With the constant threat that the Royal Navy would enter the Due east River and block his avenue of retreat, Washington ordered that all bachelor flatboats exist brought downward to his position so that the army could be moved to nearby Manhattan on the night of August 29-30, 1776. Aided by a providential fog that hid the evacuation, Washington was able to successfully move all 9,000 of his troops to Manhattan without losing a man – a remarkable military feat that astounded his British enemy.

As the New York campaign progressed, Washington's forces were subsequently defeated at the Boxing of White Plains on October 28, 1776, and later at Fort Washington on November 16, 1776. The debacle at Fort Washington cost the Americans 59 killed and another 2,837 captured. Chased from New York, Washington'due south fractured and demoralized army retreated all the manner beyond New Bailiwick of jersey and into Pennsylvania.

It was during these dark days at the close of 1776 that Thomas Paine'southward words from the recently published American Crisis rang most true - "These are the times that endeavour men's souls…the summer soldier and the sunshine patriot will, in this crisis, shrink from the service of their land; just he that stands it now deserves the love and thanks of human being and woman."

four. Washington crossed the Delaware River twice in December 1776

Washington's great triumph against the Hessian forces at Trenton on December 26, 1776, is one of the best-known episodes of the Revolutionary War. (Map: Boxing of Trenton) Fearing a counterattack by British regulars, Washington hustled his tired warriors and frozen Hessian captives back to the Pennsylvania side of the Delaware River.

Would this single victory over a Hessian garrison be enough to sustain the morale and inspiration of the beleaguered Patriot cause? Encouraged by reports of the enemies' general confusion in New Bailiwick of jersey and a successful entrada to extend the enlistments of many soldiers set up in his ranks, Washington decided to seize the initiative over again. Determined to expand upon his initial success Washington shuttled his ground forces and artillery back beyond the frozen Delaware on Dec thirty, 1776, and into a strong position along the Assunpink Creek outside of Trenton. Information technology was hither that Washington awaited the arrival of Gen. Charles Cornwallis' strength of 8,000 Redcoats and Hessians.

Disdaining any complicated maneuvers, a confident Cornwallis ordered iii successive frontal assaults on January 2, 1777, by his Hessian grenadiers and British Regulars. Each assail across the narrow Assunpink bridges and fords was driven back with heavy loss of life. The casualties were then heavy that 1 soldier remarked that the bridge to his front "looked red as claret, with their killed and wounded and their blood-red coats." (Map: Battle of 2d Trenton)

With the rapid onset of an early winter's eve, Cornwallis ordered a cessation of offensive actions. Sure of a victory the following day, the British general boasted that "we've got the erstwhile fob prophylactic now. We'll go over and bag him in the morning." Unfortunately for Cornwallis, the morning sunday that illuminated the empty American camps proved that the "onetime fox" was gone. Washington during the dark had stolen a march and had marched his army north to Princeton where the Americans proved victorious again on January 3, 1777 (Map: Battle of Princeton).

The victories at Trenton and Princeton, not merely helped to bolster the morale of the American army and encourage recruitment, but these assuming actions also greatly impressed the French who were actively weighing their involvement in the war.

Learn More:  ten Facts Near Washington's Crossing of the Delaware

5. Washington'southward smallpox inoculation programme was one of his best decisions of the war

Up until mod times, disease, not bullets, bayonets, or cannon fire, had been the smashing killer of soldiers in all armies. In 1775, smallpox had and so devastated the American army in Canada that John Adams bemoaned that "…smallpox is ten times more terrible than the British, Canadians and Indians together."

Having survived his own bout with smallpox in 1751, Washington was birthday familiar with how affliction could rob the cause of a viable army. Non but would smallpox impale off soldiers in the ranks, but the threat of infection also scared away many of the recruits that Washington's army depended upon.

Starting during the winter of 1777 in Morristown, New Jersey, Washington took the bold and controversial movement to take soldiers in his army inoculated against smallpox infection using a technique chosen variolation. Later during the winter encampment at Valley Forge, Washington went even further, enervating that his unabridged army be inoculated – an action that required great secrecy since inoculated soldiers were incapacitated for a menstruation of fourth dimension. Past some reports, death past smallpox in the ranks dropped from 17% of all deaths to a low of 1% of all reported deaths – a tremendous reduction.

Historian Elizabeth Fenn, writer of Pox Americana: The Great Smallpox Epidemic of 1775-1782, claims that "Washington's unheralded and piffling-recognized resolution to inoculate the Continental forces must surely rank with the virtually of import decisions of the war…"

Learn More: George Washington and the Inoculation of the Continental Army

6. Supply problems became one of Washington's greatest challenges

One of the oldest of military adages is that amateurs study tactics while professional warriors study logistics. Every bit with all military campaigns, providing for the vast material needs of an army in the field requires a focus on arrangement and effective supply management. Unfortunately for Washington and the Continental Army, a poor supply chain became a chronic issue that negatively impacted combat effectiveness. Biographer Ron Chernow states that "[s]eldom in history has a general been handicapped by such constantly crippling atmospheric condition…He repeatedly had to exhort Congress and the thirteen states to remedy desperate shortages of men, shoes, shirts, blankets, and gunpowder. This meant dealing with selfish, apathetic states and bureaucratic incompetence in Congress. He labored under a terrible strain that would take destroyed a lesser man."

Nowhere were supply troubles more evident and onerous than during the Valley Forge winter encampment of 1777-1778. Rather than snow and frigid temperatures, it was actually the rainy, temperate conditions at Valley Forge that turned the surrounding roads to mud, further hindering an already tenuous supply network.

Local farmers were more likely to send their foodstuffs and supplies to the nearby British who had difficult currency to offer in return. The Continental Army, by comparison, could only offer payment in greatly devalued newspaper currency or through IOUs. Washington became so concerned over the poor state of supply that he appointed Gen. Nathanael Greene as his new quartermaster. Greene, who was initially concerned about taking this thankless chore, overhauled the inefficient supply system and profoundly improved the state of the Continental Regular army through his efforts.

Video: Valley Forge in the American Revolution

seven. Mount Vernon escaped destruction in 1781, but the method used to gain its security alarmed Washington

In April of 1781, the British sloop of state of war HMS Roughshod anchored menacingly in the Potomac River near George Washington'due south plantation domicile at Mount Vernon. The Savage, under the control of Captain Thomas Graves, had been raiding upward and down the Potomac and now demanded that the General's estate provide the sloop with "a big supply of provisions." If the lodge to provide supplies was actively resisted, Mount Vernon was probable to accept been put to the torch as other nearby plantation homes had been.

While the Roughshod was anchored close to shore, seventeen intrepid Mountain Vernon slaves made their manner down to the ship and gained their freedom as they arrived on the warship's deck. Lund Washington, George Washington'southward distant cousin and estate manager, commencement thought to resist this ultimatum per his master's didactics, only afterwards agreed to provide sheep, hogs, and "an abundant supply of other articles" to the Savage, partially in an endeavour to win back the escaped slaves. Captain Graves gladly accustomed the supplies, spared the plantation, and refused to return the slaves.

Washington, once he learned of Lund'south decision to provide supplies to the enemy, was incensed. From his headquarters in New Windsor, New York, he wrote Lund and dismissed whatsoever pregnant business organization over the escaped slaves, only noted that "Information technology would have been a less painful circumstance to me, to have heard, that in effect of your non-compliance with [the HMS Cruel's asking], they had burnt my House, and laid the Plantation in ruins."

Learn More: The HMS Savage at Mount Vernon

8. Prior to its decisive victory at Yorktown, the American military machine teetered upon total plummet

Years of rampant military spending, economic mismanagement, and hyperinflation fueled by a successful British campaign to alluvion the colonies with counterfeit paper money had left the American fiscal coffers bare. Washington, in a alphabetic character to John Laurens in France, declared in January 1781 that he could non even pay the teamsters that were required to bring supplies to his troops. A gloomy and frustrated Washington admitted that "we are at the terminate of our tether, and that at present or never our deliverance must come." French setbacks in Rhode Isle, news of British successes in the Southern theater, and intelligence reports indicating a possible French exit in 1781 all added to the sense of impending defeat.

In late May 1781 Washington's situation and the fate of the American crusade began to rapidly meliorate. Comte de Rochambeau, the commander of the French troops in America, informed Washington that France had fabricated a 6,000,000 livre gift to the Continental Ground forces. But it was the news that Rochambeau did not initially share with Washington that made an even bigger touch on. The French fleet, at present operating in strength in Northward American waters, had been secretly directed to the Chesapeake and a real opportunity to defeat Cornwallis' forcefulness now existed. Washington, who had been stubbornly fixated on attacking the British base at New York City, rallied to Rochambeau'southward programme and moved his army due south to Virginia. On September 5, 1781, the French fleet under the command of Admiral de Grasse drove off the British armada sent to relieve Cornwallis. The trap was now set. The siege of Yorktown began on September 28, 1781, and concluded with a Franco-American victory on October 19, 1781 – the decisive battle of the Revolutionary War.

Learn More: The Yorktown Campaign | Watch "At present or Never: The Yorktown Campaign of 1781"

9. Washington deftly put down a growing military machine rebellion

Despite having accomplished a decisive victory at the Battle of Yorktown in October of 1781, threats to the Patriotic cause connected. In March of 1783, a growing number of American military officers, discouraged past lack of regular pay and ongoing fiscal back up, began to openly discuss options that included a wanton disbandment of the army or mayhap even a military evidence of strength pointed directly at Congress.

Washington, who learned of the "Newburgh Conspiracy" through a printed camp circular, appeared at a March fifteen, 1783 meeting and challenged the gathered group of officers. "My God! What can this writer accept in view, by recommending such measures! Can he be a friend to the army? Tin he be a friend to this land? Rather is he not an insidious foe?" Towards the terminate of his accost, Washington reached into his pocket to recollect a pair of spectacles and in a theatrical gesture remarked that "…I have not only grown gray, simply almost blind in service to my country." This brandish of cocky-sacrifice from their longstanding leader deeply affected many of the officers who in turn abandoned their treasonous thoughts and returned the obvious affection of their leader.

Videos:  Washington and the Newburgh Conspiracy

10. Washington'due south greatest display of power was his give up of power

On December 23, 1783, Washington strode into the statehouse at Annapolis, Maryland and surrendered his military commission to a grateful Congress. In front of the gathered congressmen, Washington declared, "Having at present finished the piece of work assigned me, I retire from the peachy theatre of Action—and behest an Affectionate farewell to this Baronial body under whose orders I have so long acted, I hither offering my Commission, and have my leave of all the employments of public life."

History is filled with case later case of military commanders seizing political power during times of revolution – Julius Caesar, Oliver Cromwell, Napoleon Bonaparte, Mao Zedong, and Muammar Gaddaffi are just some of the better-known examples. Nosotros take it for granted today that the United states Armed Forces are subordinated to civilian rule, just in the 18th century, it was far from sure that whatever general would merely surrender ability to a civilian authorisation. Merely for George Washington, noncombatant control of the military was a core part of his beliefs. Washington's resignation signaled to the globe and the American people that this new nation would be founded on different principles.

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Source: https://www.mountvernon.org/george-washington/the-revolutionary-war/ten-facts-about-the-revolutionary-war/

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